The human rights abuses suffered by detainees held at Guantánamo Bay have dominated many of the cases before the United Kingdom"s courts. The Human Rights Act of 1998, still relatively new to the statute book, played a central role in the detainees" arguments. The ultimate court decisions, however, often relegate such factors to the background of the case. This article examines why the deciding courts declined to develop the law of diplomatic protection on the basis of human rights concerns, and why such arguments continue to be employed by detainees. Furthermore, the article assesses why the English courts have shown greater receptiveness to arguments similarly grounded in accusations of inhuman and degrading treatment in relation to later cases involving former detainees challenging the role of the British Government in their detention.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade since the Human Rights Act 1 came into force, incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 2 into the domestic legal systems of the United Kingdom, the Convention rights rapidly came to eclipse more established domestic sources of individual rights against the state. Even before the Act came into force, Lord Hope, one of the most senior appellate judges in the English legal system, recognized that "the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into our domestic law will subject the entire legal system to a fundamental process of review and, where necessary, reform by the judiciary."
3 Few cases better illustrate the primacy of human rights discourse in English public law than those involving "detainees" held without trial by the United States government in the detention facility in Guantánamo Bay. 4 After the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks against the United States, 5 facilities needed to be found in which to hold and interrogate captured terrorist suspects. 6 The 4 As Joseph Margulies points out, the term "detainee" was adopted by President George W. Bush"s Administration primarily as a means of avoiding suggestions that captured individuals were prisoners of war under the terms of the Third Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 255 n.3 (2006) . My use of this term in this article is not intended to add any weight to this description of the individuals held at Guantánamo Bay, but rather accords to the standard practice of the United Kingdom"s courts in cases concerning these individuals. See also Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002) , http://dspace.wrlc.org/-doc/bitstream/2041/63447/00208.pdf. 5 Whilst the initial detainees held at Guantánamo Bay were captured in Afghanistan, as the "war on terror" developed individuals were seized in countries across the world. As Rosa Brooks recognized, this represented a breakdown of " [t] he distinction between zones of war and zones of peace-between spatial areas in which the law of armed conflict governs and spatial areas in which "ordinary" domestic law and international agreements govern." Rosa E. Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 721 (2004) . The global scope of the "war on terror" was emphasized by the disparate locations where British citizens held at Guantánamo Bay were captured. See At-a-glance: Guantanamo Bay Britons, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2004, http://-news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3089395.stm. 6 Ray Murphy affirms that under Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention such interrogation would be lawful even if the United States" Government recognized captured individuals as prisoners of war. However, Article 14(4) of the Convention prohibits phys-In the United Kingdom, reaction to the establishment of these Camps was initially muted. Ministers assured Parliament that detainees (including British citizens and resident foreign nationals) "are being treated in line with international humanitarian norms, in conditions in which security is paramount."
10 A ground swell of dissatisfaction only began to develop with the realization that the United States Government intended to hold these detainees for an extended period without trial or judicial scrutiny. 11 In July 2003 the British Government dispatched Lord Goldsmith, then the Attorney General, to express reservations regarding the treatment of British detainees, and in particular, concerning the proposed system of Military Commissions. 12 Whilst Lord Goldsmith did se- 15 He declared that "[t]he purpose of holding the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay was and is to put them beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts, and at the mercy of the victors."
16 Moreover, he challenged the British Government "to make plain publicly and unambiguously our condemnation of the utter lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay." 17 In the aftermath of this devastating critique, the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was obliged to publically announce the United Kingdom"s opposition to the Military Commission process, on the basis that it "would not provide the process that we would afford British nationals."
18
In 2005, the House of Lords 19 heard a case concerning whether the British Government could rely upon evidence procured by torture conducted in a third state and in which the United Kingdom was not complicit. 20 Maintaining the judicial pressure with regard to Guantánamo, Lord Hope observed in his judgment that some of the practices authorized at Camp Delta "would shock the conscience if they were ever to be authorized for use in our own country." 21 In light of this sustained criticism, and despite carefully choosing his words in repeated descriptions of Guantánamo Bay as "an anomaly that has to be dealt with sooner or later", 22 in March 2006, then Prime Minister Tony Blair finally bowed to pressure and asserted that it "would be better that it is closed." This article examines the importance of cases before the United Kingdom"s courts in influencing this longstanding judicial and executive opposition to the United States" practice in Guantánamo Bay. These cases show the impact of the detentions in Guantánamo Bay rippling through the English legal system. The key issue is the varying effectiveness of the decision by the detainees" legal representatives to focus their arguments upon allegations that the United States" authorities had engaged in human rights abuses against their clients. Arguments by counsel regarding the maltreatment of these detainees not only amplified the English judiciary"s deep disquiet surrounding Guantánamo, bringing it to the attention of the general public, but the prevailing public opinion fed back into the tenor of the decisions of the courts.
The 
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vention can … be interpreted so as to give rise to any obligation on the Contracting Parties to secure that non-contracting states, acting within their own jurisdiction, respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention." 37 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that even the absolute prohibition of torture under the ECHR 38 does not oblige contracting states which are not causally connected to such treatment to provide any civil remedy for individuals subjected to torture by a third state. 39 In light of these authorities Lord Phillips, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, emphasized the following facts: "The United States Government is not before the court, and no order of this court would be binding upon it. Conversely, the United Kingdom Government, which, through the Secretaries of State is the respondent to these proceedings, has no direct responsibility for the detention." 40 The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that, "we do not consider that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act afford any support to the contention that the Foreign Secretary owes Mr. Abbasi a duty to exercise diplomacy on his behalf."
41 Nevertheless, the Court did consider the impact of the Government"s policy statements regarding diplomatic assistance, 42 as these "indicate a clear acceptance by the government of a role in relation to protecting the rights of British citizens abroad, where there is evidence of miscarriage or denial of justice." 43 Whilst he acknowledged that these statements "contain no more than a commitment "to consider" making representations, which will be triggered by the "belief" that there is a breach of the international obliga- 37 Id. at 124. 38 Article 3 of the ECHR provides that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." ECHR, supra note 2, art. At present we consider making representations if, when all legal remedies have been exhausted, the British national and their lawyer have evidence of a miscarriage or denial of justice. We are extending this to cases where fundamental violations of the British national"s human rights had demonstrably altered the course of justice. In such cases, we would consider supporting their request for an appeal to any official human rights body in the country concerned, and subsequently giving advice on how to take their cases to relevant international human rights mechanisms. 43 Abbasi,
[Vol. XXIII::n tions," 44 Lord Phillips employed them as the basis of a legitimate expectation on the part of the British citizens that the Government will act in accordance with this stated policy: [ The FCO] has indicated … what a British citizen may expect of it. The expectations are limited and the discretion is a very wide one but there is no reason why its decision or inaction should not be reviewable if it can be shown that the same were irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation. 45 The Court of Appeal"s recognition that the government"s pronouncements could constrain its discretion allowed it to review the use of the "prerogative power" to afford diplomatic protection. 46 Lord Phillips" cautious tone nonetheless underlines the precariousness of the Court of Appeal"s jurisdiction in this field. Whilst the prerogative was accepted as being generally reviewable in the CCSU case, 47 in that decision Lord Fraser had emphasized that "[m]any of the most important prerogative powers … are concerned with control of the armed forces and with foreign policy and with other matters which are unsuitable for discussion or review in the law courts." 48 The Abbasi decision, in advancing judicial review into the arena of diplomatic relations, seemingly trespassed into the "forbidden" 49 area of foreign policy matters which had so concerned Lord Fraser. In reality, not all foreign policy matters are closed to the United Kingdom"s courts. Judges rapidly circumscribed this barrier to judicial review, with Lord Justice Richards conceding extra-judicially that "recent cases show that the forbidden areas of foreign policy and the like are much narrower than one might have thought, and that the CCSU case has opened up very considerable scope for judicial review in these fields." 50 One key decision is ex parte Everett, in which Lord Justice Taylor asserted that the provision of passports was not an unreviewable question of "high policy", but rather "a matter of administrative decision, affecting 44 Id. 45 The Secretary of State must be free to give full weight to foreign policy considerations, which are not justiciable. However, that does not mean the whole process is immune from judicial scrutiny. The citizen"s legitimate expectation is that his request will be "considered", and that in that consideration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance. 52 The Court of Appeal thus accepted that it was for the Foreign Secretary to decide whether to assist a citizen facing abuses of process overseas, 53 but refused to allow the Minister to make this decision "unless and until he has formed some judgment as to the gravity of the miscarriage."
54 This position can be compared to the recognition by the United States Supreme Court that where the United States" Government expressed concerns that a case might undermine aspects of foreign policy the Court would, on a case-by-case basis, assess whether the gravity of such concerns warranted the dismissal of the law suit. 55 In the instant case, however, the British Government had not been inactive with regards to Abbasi"s request. Not only had the request been considered, but FCO officials confirmed to the court that "the British detainees are the subject of discussions between this country and the United States both at Secretary of State and lower official levels." 56 The court accepted that such activity on Abbasi"s behalf was sufficient to fulfill his legitimate expectations and refused to require that specific representations should be made to the United States Government.
57
A year after the decision in Abbasi, political pressure, rather than a court order, compelled then Prime Minister Tony Blair to broach the subject of the return of British citizens held at Camp Delta in discussions with President George W. Bush while in London. 58 
The United States declared the three men to be enemy combatants and all were subsequently transferred to Guantánamo Bay, where they were detained and interrogated.
62
With the possibility of these men seeking protection from the countries that they had fled as refugees providing cold comfort in the cells of Guantánamo, they argued that the British Government"s refusal to assist them, when it had successfully petitioned for the release of British citizens, constituted discrimination on the basis of nationality. 63 Moreover, whereas the claim in Abbasi focused on arbitrary detention, the claimants In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Laws considered that whether the British Government"s policy of drawing a distinction between British citizens and permanent residents in the provision of diplomatic protection amounted to discrimination depended upon an exploration of why such contrasting treatment had occurred, 65 [I]t may be said there are two possible answers: (1) because they were not British nationals -as the appellants say; (2) because they were not persons whom the United Kingdom was by the rules of international law entitled to protect by means of a State to State claim -as the respondents say. Each answer is in a sense true. By what principle do we decide between them? 66 Answering this question turned upon an assessment of whether nationals and resident foreign nationals where actually "materially different" 67 groups for the purpose of diplomatic protection, permitting differential treatment under the Race Relations Act:
The national and the non-national are in truth in materially different cases one from the other for the purpose of the exercise of the right of diplomatic protection by means of State to State claims. … The non-nationals have been treated differently from the nationals not because of their race (nationality) but because one group is entitled to diplomatic protection and the other is not.
68
Lord Justice Laws therefore ruled that the claimants would have to establish that the Foreign Secretary"s decision to deny foreign nationals diplomatic protection "is frankly perverse," an endeavor which was "manifestly unachievable" 69 on the basis of arguments that they had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal accepted, as it had in Abbasi, that regardless of the gravity of the infringement of an individual"s human rights, "the ECHR contains no requirement that a signatory State should take up the complaints of any individual within its territory touching the acts of another sovereign 64 
26

PACE INT'L L. REV.
[Vol. XXIII::n State." 70 As the Divisional Court, which first heard the claim, inevitably asserted, "the powerful submissions made on behalf of the claimants founder, perhaps uncomfortably and unsatisfactorily, on the rock which prevented the Abbasi claim from succeeding." 71 As in Abbasi, such arguments failed to address the British government"s contention that the United Kingdom owed no duty to provide diplomatic protection to the world at large. 72 Therefore, whilst Lord Justice Laws did accept that "[t]he prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, some of them at least, have suffered grave privations, 73 this acknowledgement was worth little when British government did not dispute that the detainees had been "subjected at least to inhuman and degrading treatment," 74 but the claimants could not link the British government to those abuses.
The rejection of the appeal by British resident detainees in Al Rawi closed the legal avenues by which they could pursue diplomatic protection. Over the course of the next year, however, with political pressure on the British government to act on the detainees" behalf mounting as a result of the attention brought to their plight by this case, 75 Sadat Sayeed foresaw that "their fate will be determined by the outcome of ongoing Anglo-US diplomacy." 76 The focus of these cases upon the detainees" treatment, a strategy which delivered "strong arguments in the context of political debate," 77 goes a long way towards explaining this change in the British Government"s position. As Philippe Sands, QC, once junior counsel in Abbasi, explains with regard to that case:
The Court"s judgment added great authority to those who were relying on international law to challenge the conditions of the Guantánamo detainees. … To a significant extent the judgement of the Court of Appeal has set the tone for British public opinion on the issue of Guantánamo. 78 The most prominent example of the impact of the claims was Lord Steyn"s famous excoriation of Guantánamo Bay as "a legal black hole,"
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which can be traced directly to the submissions of counsel for the claimants in Abbasi, Mr. Nicholas Blake QC. 80 Furthermore, the Divisional Court"s decision in Al Rawi even prompted Parliament"s Joint Committee on Human Rights to review the cooperation of the United Kingdom"s security service with the United States.
81 Therefore, despite the courts" refusal to intervene, the claimants" assertions of arbitrary detention and torture became embedded in the public consciousness in the United Kingdom. In August 2007, an eventual effort on the part of the British government in response to this mounting public pressure, 82 92 The then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, declared at a Press Conference at the Pentagon that, "Australia is satisfied that the military commission process in relation to David Hicks, as he is the one Australian held in Guantanamo Bay, will provide a proper measure of justice. 
2011] THE RIPPLE EFFECT: GUANTÁNAMO BAY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM'S COURTS 29
fy for British citizenship, on the basis of his mother"s birth in the United Kingdom, 94 in the expectation that he would be treated in the same way as the nine British citizens who had been released and who had not faced charges when they returned to the United Kingdom.
In response, the then Home Secretary informed Hicks that he would, using his powers under the British Nationality Act of 1981, immediately revoke any citizenship that he was obliged to grant, 95 on the basis that Hicks" actions had been "seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK." 96 The power to revoke citizenship on this basis, however, was not enacted until a 2002 amendment to the Act, 97 post-dating Hicks" activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, the original wording of section 40 of the British Nationality Act of 1981 still applied, and this required the Home Secretary to establish that Hicks had "shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty" 98 before he could be deprived of his citizenship.
The conditions in which Hicks was being held again loomed large in the case. In perhaps the most reserved language used by a British judge in describing Camp Delta, Mr. Justice Collins recognized the importance of expediting the case on the basis that "the claimant is held in what are no doubt far from pleasant conditions." 99 The case, however, turned on the substantive question of whether Hicks" activities before he was granted citizenship could form the basis of a justification for revoking it, with the British Government contending that "[d]isloyalty and disaffection may be shown without allegiance as a citizen being owed." [T] he word "disaffected" as well as the word "disloyal" requires an attitude of mind towards an entity to which allegiance is owed, or at least to which the person belongs or is attached. . . . To be disaffected is to be estranged in affection towards an entity to which one owes allegiance or with which one has at least a relationship. The word is not apt to cover, in relation to the United Kingdom, an outsider, whether a German general during the 1st World War, or an Australian in Afghanistan in 1990.
102
As a result of this ruling, Hicks had to be registered as a British citizen, with citizenship being granted on July 7, 2006. In the preceding months, however, the British government had worked assiduously to secure the passage through Parliament of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of 2006. This Act permitted the removal of citizenship from dual nationals, such as Hicks, on the broad basis that "the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good." This measure constitutes the most egregious displays of "personalized" legislation to be enacted in the United Kingdom in recent years, 104 having received its Royal Assent more than three months after the High Court had ruled in Hicks" favor and having only come into force in June 2006. Given that legislation already provided for the revocation of citizenship of any dual national who could be shown, since 2002, to have acted in a manner "seriously prejudicial" to the United Kingdom"s vital interests, 105 Hicks can be seen as virtually the only individual against whom such extended powers were necessary. Such machinations were of doubtful worth when it is considered that in his judgment, Lord Justice Pill had taken great care to acknowledge that Hicks enjoyed much weaker links to the United Kingdom than other British-citizen detainees, and 101 Id. hearing Mohamed continued to reflect the "deep concern" 123 for the treatment of Guantánamo detainees which had prevailed in the courts since Abbasi. In their fourth judgment in the case, delivered just prior to Mohamed"s release, they asserted the importance of making this evidence public given the subject matter it concerned, If the redacted passages containing a gist of what was reported by officials of the United States Government were made public that would enable more informed and accurate public debate to take place and Governments to be held to account. The fact that the issues raised relate to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment have a particular resonance … 124 Moreover, they affirmed that some of the substance of the redacted paragraphs amounted to "a short summary of what was reported to the United Kingdom authorities by the officials of the United States Government as to what they say happened to [Mohamed] during his detention in Pakistan in April and May 2002." 125 Following the lead of the Court of Appeal judgment in Abbasi, the Divisional Court sought to extend its influence to decision makers in the United States. Emphasizing "the long history of the common law and democracy which we share with the United States", Lord Justice Thomas asserted that it was,
[I]n our view difficult to conceive that a democratically elected and accountable government could possibly have any rational objection to placing into the public domain such a summary of what its own officials reported as to how a detainee was treated by them and which made no disclosure of sensitive intelligence matters. 126 
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[Vol. XXIII::n " [F] or the purposes of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in torture, "complicity" requires proof of three elements: (1) knowledge that torture is taking place, (2) a direct contribution by way of assistance that (3) has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."
136
This interpretation of the offense of torture would suggest that, in taking part in interviews and providing information for use in interrogations, officials such as Witness B would have been complicit in torture if they knew that such mistreatment of detainees was taking place. Even if criminal charges do not result, this does not preclude state responsibility for torture, should the publication of information required by the Divisional Court in Mohamed reveal the United Kingdom"s collusion in activities is incompatible with the Article 3 ECHR prohibition of torture. 137 Indeed, had such evidence been available to the claimants in Al Rawi, the Court of Appeal could not have side-stepped questions concerning the extra-territorial effect of the ECHR.
138
Whilst serving as British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown continued to argue that the ECHR does not include "a positive legal obligation to report or seek to prevent acts of torture carried out by other states abroad."
139 Nonetheless, it is clear that where a state is complicit in another state"s torture of an individual, this will be actionable. The type of collusion which has been dealt with most frequently by the European Court of Human Rights has involved efforts by parties to the ECHR to extradite individuals to states where they were at risk of such treatment. In Saadi v. Italy the Court held that "[s]ince protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment." 
